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1. Introduction 
Supply Chain Management (SCM) can be pursued by adopting a centralized or 
decentralized control. In the former case, a unique decision maker exists in the SC, who 
possesses any information on the whole SC that is relevant to make decision and the 
contractual power to have such decisions be implemented. The centralized control assures 
the system efficiency (channel coordination). In the case of decentralized control, different 
decision makers exist in the supply chain (SC), who pursue their own objectives, which can 
be conflicting and lead to system inefficiency. To cope with this problem, proper 
coordination mechanisms need to be adopted, which modify the incentives of the different 
decision makers, so as to induce them to maximize the SC total profit.  
SC contracts are coordination mechanisms that utilize incentives to make SC actors’ 
decisions coherent among each other. In particular, the incentives let the risk and the 
revenue (which arise from different sources of uncertainty and from channel coordination, 
respectively) be shared by all SC actors. 
SC contracts allow two main objectives to be achieved: i) to increase the total SC profit so as 
to make it closer to the profit resulting from a centralized control (channel coordination) and 
ii) to share the risks among the SC partners (Tsay et al., 1999) 
A further important issue for the contract design concerns the so-called win-win condition: 
this occurs if under the contract every SC actor gains a profit higher than he/she would get 
without contract. Otherwise, the SC actor would not be prompted to adopt the contract. 
Different models of SC contracts have been developed in the literature. They include the 
quantity flexibility contracts (Tsay, 1999), the backup agreements (Eppen & Iyer, 1997), the 
buy back or return policies (Emmons & Gilbert, 1998), the incentive mechanisms (Lee & 
Whang, 1999), the revenue sharing contracts (Cachon & Lariviere, 2000; Giannoccaro & 
Pontrandolfo, 2003), the allocation rules (Cachon & Lariviere, 1999), and the quantity 
discounts (Weng, 1995). 
Most of these models address the problem of coordinating serial SCs made up of two stages. 
Moreover, the majority of them addresses channel coordination, whereas much less 
emphasis is given to the analysis of the conditions supporting the contract implementation. 
In fact, even if an effective contract exists, this does not imply that the SC agents will adopt 
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it. They need to reach an agreement on the values of the contract parameters, given that they 
influence their profit. As a result, every SC actor will tend to impose her own preferences 
that could not be accepted by the others. 
We focuses on the implementation issues of SC contracts. In particular, we consider the 
revenue sharing contract. As pointed out by Cachon & Lariviere (2002), a few problems can 
limit the use of revenue sharing contracts, namely the amount of administration costs due to 
the contract implementation, and the retailer efforts on sales. In fact, once a contract is 
designed, its implementation is not always straightforward. Organizational problems, such 
as those related to the parties’ relative contractual power as well as the need for sharing 
certain information among parties, may indeed lessen the potential benefits coming from 
adopting a contract. Therefore, adequate attention should be paid to (i) designing the 
contract so as to make it acceptable by the parties and (ii) analyzing the process by which 
the parties reach the agreement on the contract. 
Our aim is to characterize the scenarios that are appropriate for the adoption of the revenue 
sharing (RS) contract. First we identify the main features characterizing the video-rental 
industry (such as the distribution of contractual power among the actors and the shape of 
the supply chains involving them) in which the RS contract is already effectively used, and 
compare such features with other industries not adopting the contract. Then, we develop a 
simulation analysis to define the scenarios in which the RS is more likely to be successfully 
implemented. 
Simulation is carried out through an approach based on agent-based systems (Ferber, 1999; 
Durfee, 1998; Wooldridge, 2000). Such systems consist of a set of autonomous agents (each 
modeling a certain SC actor), which share their information and cooperate each other to 
achieve a global goal while optimizing their own objectives.  
Recently, the agent-based systems have been used to address SCM issues. For example, Lin 
& Shaw (1998) propose a multi agent information system approach for the re-engineering of 
the order fulfilment process in a SC. Cantamessa (1997) reviews the seminal works on agent-
based modelling applied to address manufacturing issues and proposes a generic agent-
based simulator useful to build agent-based models in manufacturing domain. Similarly, 
but with more attention for SCM applications, Swaminathan et al. (1998) propose a multi-
agent simulation-based framework for developing customized SCM models from a library 
of software components involving generic SCM processes and activities. Albino et al., (2006) 
develop an agent model to study cooperation and competition in the SCs of an industrial 
district. 
The agent-based systems approach is chosen as it allows us to model the cooperative and 
competitive behaviors of the different SC actors (that independently make decision, 
coherently with a decentralized control) and the strategies they adopt to negotiate. 
Each agent is provided by objectives, beliefs, and actions. They negotiate seeking to reach an 
agreement on the values of the contract parameters. At the end of negotiation, however, the 
SC agents could adopt or not the RS contract due to the beliefs influencing their behaviors. 
In this way the scenarios which favor the implementation of the RS contract can be 
identified. 
The chapter is organized as follows. First, we introduce the RS contract and the main 
features of the industries in which it is used. Then, we design a RS contract for a two-stage 
SC that assures the channel coordination and satisfy the win-win condition. Successively, we 
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develop the agent-based system model of the negotiation process. Finally, the simulation 
analysis is carried out and the results are presented.  
2. The revenue sharing contract  
The RS contract is a coordination mechanism offered by the distributor to the retailer, which 
modifies the retailer’s profit (as well as the distributor’s) so as to incentive her to make 
decision coherent with the SC total optimization. A RS contract is described by two 
parameters (ω, Φ): the supplier charges the retailer the unit wholesale price ω, lower than 
the unit marginal cost c, in exchange for the percentage (1-Φ) of the retailer’s revenue. The 
condition ω < c guarantees channel coordination, whereas Φ determines the distribution of 
total profits between supplier and retailer. In particular, Φ is the SC profit quota gained by 
the retailer (Cachon, 2004). 
The RS contract is widespread mostly in the video-rental industry and has been adopted by 
companies such as Blockbuster Inc. and Holliwood Entertainment. The specific features of 
this industry that can be identified as favorable to the application of the RS contract are 
listed in Table 1. 
 
Demand uncertainty (that can be stochastic and variable) 
Single selling period 
Single type of retailers 
Goods supplied by unique supplier 
Competition among retailers 
Not satisfied inventory and demand are lost 
Demand not influenced by sales promotions made by retailers 
Easy control on retailer profits by the distributors 
Table 1. Features of video-rental industry important for application of RS contract 
Based on such features, we argue that a few other industries not yet adopting the RS 
contract are potential user of the RS contracts: CD, editing, newspaper, flowers. 
2.1 The design of the revenue sharing contract for a two-stage supply chain 
In this Section we present a revenue sharing (RS) contract and point out the way in which it 
can assures both effectiveness and desirability. The RS model is said to be effective (first 
objective) if it assures channel coordination, while it is said to be desirable (second objective), 
if all the chain partners increase their profits (with respect to the market setting) by adopting 
the contract. Notice that desirability is key if the bargaining power is symmetrically 
distributed among the chain partners, whereas it is less relevant if one or a few partners can 
make the others accept an uneven sharing of the (increase of the) total profit. 
Consider a SC in which a distributor D provides a single product to a retailer R, who in turn 
serves the market demand. The demand is uncertain, with probability density function fd(d). 
The marginal unit costs of the retailer and distributor are c1 and c2, respectively. The 
distributor charges the retailer a wholesale unit price ω. The retailer sells the product at the 
unit price p (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. The two-stage SC model 
The SC is characterized by a decentralized control, namely each SC actor makes decision by 
optimizing his own objective. In particular, the distributor D chooses the wholesale unit 
price ω, whereas the retailer decides the order quantity q, each of them trying to maximize 
his own profit. Both actors are risk neutral. 
To achieve channel coordination (effectiveness), the two independent decision-makers 
should act coherently so as to maximize the SC total profit given by: 
 Π(q) = R(q) – q⋅(c1+c2) (3.1) 
being R(q) the expected retailer’s revenue during the selling period. 
Under the RS contract, the retailer’s profit is given by: 
 ΠR(q) = Φ⋅R(q) – q⋅(ω + c1) (3.2) 
Therefore, the retailer’s optimal quantity qo must satisfy: 
 Φ⋅R’(q°) = ω + c1 (3.3) 
Hence, to achieve channel coordination, it is necessary that the optimal order quantity 
chosen by the retailer (qh) corresponds to the order quantity that optimizes the SC total 
profit (qc). 
The latter satisfies: 
 R’(qc) = c2 + c1  (3.4) 
By matching the (3.3) with the (3.4), it follows that, under the RS contract, the distributor 
will set a wholesale unit price such that: 
 ω = Φ⋅(c1 + c2) – c1 (3.5) 
Given that ω must be positive, it follows that:  
 Φ  > c1/(c1+c2) = Φmin,cc (3.6) 
To assure desirability, the contract has to be designed so that every SC actor achieves a 
profit higher than he/she would do without contract. Otherwise, the SC actor would not be 
prompted to adopt the contract. We measure such a desirability for actor X by the expected 
value of the ratio ΠXc/ΠXm between his profits with and without (i.e. under a market-like 
setting) the contract. The higher the ratio (provided that it is not lower than 1), the more 
actor X is content with the adopted contract. To measure such a desirability index it should 
be known the unit price applied by every actor to his customer under a market-like setting 
(Giannoccaro & Pontrandolfo, 2004). 
The values of Φ  that assure desirability as stated above can be derived by letting all the 
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The profits of retailer under the contract and the market-like setting are respectively: 
 ΠRc = Φ·p·min{q,d}-(ω+c1)q (3.7) 
 ΠRm = p·min{q,d}-(ωm+c1)q (3.8) 
where ωm is the market price. 
The profits of distributor under the contract and the market-like setting are respectively: 
 ΠDc = (1-Φ)p·min{q,d}+(ω - c2)q (3.9) 
 ΠDm = (ωm - c2)q (3.10) 
By substituting equations (3.7) to (3.10) into the two win-win conditions (ΠXc/ΠXm>1) and 
being ω given by the (3.5), it follows: 
 Φ  > [p·E(min{qm,d})-(ωm+c1)qm]/[p·E(min{qc,d})-(c1 + c2)qc] =Φmin,ww (3.11) 
 Φ  < 1-[(ωm - c2)qm)]/[(p·E(min{qc,d})-(c1 + c2)qc] = Φmax (3.12) 
Therefore, any RS contract, which is both effective and desirable, has to simultaneously 
satisfy the inequalities (3.6), (3.11), and (3.12), which results in Φ  ∈ {Φmin;Φmax}, being 
Φmin = max{Φmin,cc, Φmin,ww}.  
Notice that Φ  affects how the SC profit is shared between the retailer and distributor. This 
issue is directly related to the contract implementation process: in such a process the 
distribution of the contractual power play a key role in determining the actual Φ value. 
Therefore, we explicitly model contractual power in next Section. 
3. The model of the negotiation process  
In this Section we model the negotiation process between the distribution and the retailer, to 
analyze whether and how they reach an agreement on the Φ value.  
We assume that the negotiation process is affected by two main variables, namely the 
relative contractual power of the SC actors and the collaboration among them. 
The relative contractual power has been described in the literature in terms of abandon of 
the negotiation process by the actor: the most powerful actor will tend to devote lesser time 
to negotiate and will tend to more frequently threaten the abandon of the negotiation. In this 
way, the most powerful actor influences the negotiation process so as to reach a more 
advantageous agreement (Grant, 1999). 
In particular, we use the following two variables to operationalize the contractual power of 
the SC actor: (1) the propensity to negotiate, and (2) the propensity to threaten the abandon 
of the negotiation. We assume that if the contractual power is high then the propensity to 
negotiate is low and the propensity to threaten the abandon of the negotiation is high.  
The above variables model the competitive behavior of the parties. However, the latter can 
show a cooperative behavior as well. Relationships based on collaboration between buyers 
and suppliers characterize indeed the most recent trends in supply management. In this case 
the SC actors tend to become partners sharing costs and rewards (Lamming, 1993; Bensaou, 
1999). Therefore, when the two actors are collaborative, they will behave so as to reach an 
agreement that satisfy both of them. We then consider the propensity to collaborate of the 
SC actors as a further variable of the model. 
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3.1 The Agent-based model of the negotiation process 
Let us consider the SC described in Figure 1. The two SC actors are the agents of the model. 
The two agents intend to adopt the revenue sharing contract (ω,Φ) to achieve channel 
coordination. To do this and increase their profits, they need to reach an agreement on the 
value of Φ ∈ [Φmin; Φmax]. 
Therefore the retailer and the distributor negotiate the Φ value. We assume a discrete time 
negotiation process made up of K steps. Each step (k) of the negotiation process starts with a 
bid of the distributor that offers a given value ofΦ (ΦD(k)), followed by the answer of the 
retailer. Notice that the first bid of the distributor is equal to Φmin, whereas the most 
advantageous value of Φ for the retailer is Φmax. 
According to the most common agent architecture (Wooldridge, 2000), the agents are 
defined in terms of objectives, beliefs, and actions. In particular, the beliefs defines the agent 
mental model that drives its behaviour. Behavioural rules defining the agent behaviour are 
built using beliefs and actions, namely the values of the beliefs influence the action the agent 
undertakes. 
The objective of each agent is to maximize his own profit. 
Based on the above discussion, the beliefs of the agent are: 
− Propensity to negotiate, namely the probability that the agent will negotiate at a given 
step  (Prn); 
− Propensity to threaten the abandon of the negotiation (Prt), namely the probability that 
the agent will threaten the abandon of the negotiation at a given step; 
− Propensity to collaborate, namely the variation of Φ (ΔΦ) that the agent is willing to 
offer at the next step. Notice that this is positive for the distributor and negative for the 
retailer. 
We assumed the first two beliefs as dynamic (i.e. they change according to the trends shown 














Figure 2. The agent dynamics beliefs. 
At a given step of the negotiation, each agent is characterized by the values of propensity to 
negotiate and propensity to threaten the abandon of negotiation. These values represent the 
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probability that in step k the agent will negotiate (Prn(k)) and will threaten the abandon of 
the negotiation (Prt(k)), respectively. 
All the beliefs influence the choice of the actions undertaken and theΦ value offered at each 
step by the agent. 
The agent has four alternative actions to be chosen: 
− “To accept the bid”; 
− “To not accept the bid and to make a new bid”; 
− “To exit the negotiation”; 
− “To threaten the abandon of the negotiation”. 
At each step a random number x ∈ (0,1) is drawn lots. If x is lower than Prn(k), the agent will 
accept the bid. On the contrary, if x is higher than Prn(k), the agent will randomly choose 
between two actions, i.e. “to not accept the bid and to make a new bid” and “to exit the 
negotiation”.  In the first case, there is also the possibility to threaten the abandon of the 
negotiation. As before, a random number is drawn lots. Only if the latter is lower than Prt(k), 
the agent will threaten the abandon of the negotiation. In this case, the other agent has only 
two alternative “to accept” or to “exit the negotiation”. The choice between these two 
actions is random. 
The value of Φ that is offered by the agent at each step depends on the propensity to 
















Figure 3. The choice of Φ during the negotiation 
The negotiation process can end in two ways: 1) the agents reach an agreement on the value 
of Φ (agreed Φ), and 2) the agents do not reach an agreement. 
Our aim is to analyze how the relative contractual power of SC actors and the collaboration 
among them influence the RS contract adoption, in terms of the actual use of the RS contract 
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4. Simulation analysis and results 
We conducted a simulation analysis using the proposed model (the assumed cost and 
demand data are reported in Table 2). The simulation is developed by using MatLab. 
 
SC Variables c1 c2 ωm P D 
Value 1 2 18 30 
Normal distribution, 
mean = 100,  
std. dev. = 30 
Table 2. Cost and demand data. 
We simulated different scenarios characterized by diverse behaviors of the retailer and the 
distributor due to the values assumed by their beliefs, i.e. propensity to negotiate (Prn), 
propensity to threaten the abandon of the negotiation (Prt), and propensity to collaborate 
(ΔΦ). In particular, each variable can assume two values, namely High and Low. Figure 4 
depicts the data assumed for the propensity to negotiate and the propensity to collaborate in 
both cases. ΔΦ is assumed equal to 0.1 (high) and 0.05 (low).  
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Figure 4. Data assumed for the agent beliefs 
In each scenario we carried out 1000 runs and measured: the number of times that an 
agreement is reached on Φ (%RS is the relative frequency of agreement) and the average 
value of agreed Φ (AvΦ). Then, we computed  the SC profit, which depends on both %RS 
and AvΦ: we assumed that the actors achieve the profits associated with the contract with 
probability %RS and the profits associated with the market setting with probability (1-%RS). 
The SC profits are then given by: 
ΠSC = ΠR + ΠD 
ΠR(D) = %RSΠR(D)c + (1- %RS)ΠR(D)c 
Results of the simulation analysis are shown in Table 3.  
In Table 4, only the SC profit are reported. Notice that the worst SC profits are achieved 
when the contractual power is low for both SC agents (fourth column), no matter the 
propensity to collaborate. In such a case, none of the actors is able to impose his/her 
preference and the negotiation tends to end more frequently without an agreement. Only a 
high propensity to collaborate by the retailer can slightly improve the SC profit under this 
contractual power setting. 
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AvΦ %RS ΠSC ΠR ΠD 
Distributor Retailer Distributor Retailer      
High High Low Low 0.366697 58.90% 2353.584 786.064 1567.52 
High High High  Low 0.368474 66.00% 2384.233 813.5713 1570.662 
High High Low High 0.365149 66.30% 2385.529 809.0421 1576.486 
High High High High 0.36616 73.00% 2414.452 833.8039 1580.648 
Low High Low Low 0.359251 60.10% 2358.764 778.885 1579.879 
Low High High Low 0.360741 64.10% 2376.031 794.3732 1581.658 
Low High Low High 0.362365 59.40% 2355.742 781.2793 1574.463 
Low High High High 0.354521 69.60% 2399.774 801.5961 1598.178 
High Low Low Low 0.37171 61.10% 2363.081 801.4199 1561.661 
High Low High Low 0.37279 58.10% 2350.13 792.2589 1557.871 
High Low Low High 0.37223 58.80% 2353.152 793.9527 1559.199 
High Low High High 0.37048 67.90% 2392.436 823.6709 1568.765 
Low Low Low Low 0.37006 55.40% 2338.474 778.6829 1559.792 
Low Low High Low 0.37154 53.80% 2331.567 775.0321 1556.535 
Low Low Low High 0.36048 62.00% 2366.966 787.0223 1579.944 
Low Low High  High 0.37016 58.10% 2350.13 788.3914 1561.739 
Table 3. Results 
 
 Contractual Power  
Propensity to 
collaborate 
D R D R D R D R Average 
D R H H H L L H L L  
H H 2414.45 2392.44 2399.77 2350.13 2389.20 
H L 2384.23 2350.13 2376.03 2331.57 2360.49 
L H 2353.58 2363.08 2358.76 2338.47 2365.35 
L L 2384.45 2364.70 2372.58 2346.78 2353.48 
Average 2384.45 2364.70 2372.58 2346.78  
Table 4. SC profits 
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Also, the results are quite poor when the propensity to collaborate is low for both agents 
(fourth row), regardless the contractual power. In this case the agents are not able to reach 
an agreement on the value ofΦ, given that they tend to modify their initial preference at a 
lower rate (low ΔΦ). 
Leaving out these worst cases (last column and row), the best SC profits are achieved when 
both agents are highly propense to collaborate (first row). In fact, in this case the agreement 
is reached with a higher frequency, given that both the agents modify the Φ value with a 
higher pace (higher ΔΦ). Only when both agents have low contractual power (last column), 
a high propensity to collaborate of both is not enough to guarantee an adequate percentage 
of agreement: this could depends on the sensible reduction of those agreements wherein the 
negotiation ends because one of the parties forces the other to accept his bid. This seems to 
be confirmed by the good results achieved when both agents have high contractual power 
(first column): the high quota of “forced” agreements compensate the possible lower 
propensity to collaborate. 
Notice that the best scenario, characterized by high contractual power and propensity to 
collaborate for both agents, is associated with the highest number of agreements (73%).  
82In this case even though the value of the average Φ is not the highest (which would let 
think the retailer to miss his highest possible profit), the retailer gains the highest profit, due 
to a higher number of agreements. Furthermore, also the distributor achieves a good 
performance (i.e. the best third one of its results). 
5. Conclusions  
The revenue sharing contract is a coordination mechanism adopted by supply chains, 
wherein the decision making process is decentralized, to assure channel coordination. It has 
been mainly used in the video-rental industry by firms such as Blockbuster or Hollywood 
Planet. Despite the ease of this coordination mechanism, based on two parameters, the RS 
contract is not much widespread in other industries due to implementation problems. We 
have then analyzed this issue.  
First, we have defined the features of the video rental industry which we believe critical 
with respect to the RS contract adoption. This has allowed other industries to be identified 
as potential users of the contract. Then, we have described the design of a RS contract for a 
two-stage SC that assures the channel coordination and allows the SC actors to increase their 
profits. 
Successively, we have developed an agent-based system model of the negotiation process 
between the two SC actors which takes into account two further variables, which we believe 
to play a key role for the negotiation: the relative contractual power and the collaboration of 
the SC actors. 
In the proposed model, the two agents (i.e. the SC actors) negotiate on the value of the 
contract parameter that influences the SC profit sharing between them. Based on the agent 
beliefs influencing their behaviors, the negotiation process can end in different ways: either 
the agents reach an agreement on the value of the parameter, or they can not reach such an 
agreement (which results in the SC not adopting the contract and operating under a market 
setting). 
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Finally, we have carried out a simulation analysis aimed at identifying the scenarios in 
which the RS is more likely to be adopted. In particular, we have measured how many times 
the negotiation ends with an agreement and the agreed value of the parameter. 
The simulation has shown that high propensity to collaborate for both SC actors and high 
contractual power of al least one SC actor prove critical for the RS implementation. In this 
case only the collaboration of retailer can increase the SC profit. Further research will be 
devoted to extend the model to different SC topologies (e.g. SCs made up of one distributor 
and multiple retailers). 
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aim of this book is at revealing and illustrating this diversity in terms of scientific and theoretical fundamentals,
prevailing concepts as well as current practical applications.
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